



Five things I wish I knew 10 years ago

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


2015 "The Year of the Breach?"

| ORGANIZATION | RECORDS | TYPE | INDUSTRY | SCORE |
|--|------------|---------------------|------------|-------|
| ANTHEM INSURANCE COMPANIES (ANTHEM BLUE CROSS) (U.S.) | 78,800,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | HEALTHCARE | 10.0 |
| GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF POPULATION AND CITIZENSHIP AFFAIRS/THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF LAND REGISTRY AND CADASTER (TURKEY) | 50,000,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | GOVERNMENT | 9.9 |
| U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (U.S.) | 21,000,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | GOVERNMENT | 9.6 |
| TOPFACE (RUSSIA) | 20,000,000 | ACCOUNT ACCESS | TECHNOLOGY | 9.2 |
| GAANA.COM / TIMES INTERNET (PAKISTAN) | 10,000,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | RETAIL | 8.9 |
| RAKUTEN AND LINE CORP (JAPAN) | 7,850,000 | ACCOUNT ACCESS | RETAIL | 8.8 |
| TALKTALK (U.K.) | 4,000,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | OTHER | 8.8 |
| MEDICAL INFORMATICS ENGINEERING (U.S.) | 3,900,000 | IDENTITY THEFT | HEALTHCARE | 8.8 |
| ADULT FRIENDFINDER (U.S.) | 3,867,997 | EXISTENTIAL DATA | OTHER | 8.6 |
| REGISTER.COM (U.S.) | 1,400,000 | EXISTENTIAL DATA | TECHNOLOGY | 8.5 |
| SAUDI ARABIA GOVERNMENT (SAUDI ARABIA) | 1,000,000 | EXISTENTIAL DATA | GOVERNMENT | 8.4 |



Logging of Application and Server Logs





Managing the Breach

Talk to the leader early

Establish expectations and deadlines

There will be plenty of time to disagree later

http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule



Decision Team Before the Incident



Taking the time to set up a decision team before the incident is worth the effort

Incidents are usually out of sight out of mind

Have a defined team who can make decisions and interpret applicable regulations



Media Release

Media Release Template ready

- Required for 90 days for individuals without a mailing address
- Easier to edit than draft
- Use your contacts with local media
- https://www.nomoreclipboard.com/notice

Collect and Organize Documentation

Taking time to collect and organize documentation after an incident is worth the effort

There is never enough time to properly document after an incident.

Documentation cannot be organized as well 3 months after the incident



Phishing Incidents



Value of Encrypted email



Once encrypted always encrypted



Audit Documentation

HHS OCR auditor's are more concerned about documentation proof than actually protecting the patient's information

OCR follows a standard checklist that is designed to meet OCR's needs

No auditor ever asks you to explain your own process to address an incident



Insider Threat

Insider Threat is a current of former employee, contractor or business partner who:

- Has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data
- Has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of the organization's information or information systems

Most common insider crimes:

- Unauthorized access
- Unintentional exposure of private or sensitive data
- Viruses, worms or other malicious code
- Theft of intellectual property





Sometimes you just can't figure out exactly what happened

Lack of logging often helps reach this conclusion

Conflicting human stories can also lead to a non-conclusion